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Abstract
What are the origins of national identity? We extend the model by Alesina et al.
(2019) to analyze the incentives of elites to use specific types of identity policies in
response to shocks, and the extent to which such policies should be effective. To elicit
changes in identity we use data on first names given in German cities between 1800 and
1875. We show that parents in cities treated by nation building policies responded
by choosing first names of German origin for their children. To control for family-
specific confounding factors, we exploit within family variation. We also show that
the response can be conditional on cultural distance to the elite. Finally, Germanic
first names had remarkable predictive power for behaviour. We find that individuals
with Germanic first names made different marriage choices and were more likely to
get actively involved and decorated during the German-French War in 1870/71 and
the First World War.
JEL Classification:
Keywords:
∗Kersting: Humboldt-University Berlin. Email: f.kersting@hu-berlin.de. Wolf: Humboldt-
University Berlin, CEPR, and CESifo. Email: nikolaus.wolf@wiwi.hu-berlin.de. We would like
to thank Robert Akerlof, Thilo Albers, Davide Cantoni, Neil Cummins, Theocharis Grigoriadis, Klaus
Schmidt, Moses Shayo, and Thierry Verdier for helpful comments as well as seminar and conference partic-
ipants at WEHC Boston, Heidelberg, Oxford, CRC Workshops Ohlstadt, Munich, and Schwanenwerder.
We also would like to thank Jesper Zedlitz and his team for providing the loss lists of World War I, Walter
Bauernfeind and the city archive of Nuremberg for as well as numerous other city archives for provid-
ing data on first names. Christopher Pro¨mel provided excellent research support. Financial support by
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through CRC TRR 190 is gratefully acknowledged
1 Introduction
Why are people willing to die for their country? Why would parents send their children
to battle or sign war bonds even when the situation is hopeless? These and similar
questions have fascinated social scientists at least since the writings of Durkheim, Veblen
and Weber. The modern approach evolves around the concept of “social identity”, namely
the idea that people value their membership in social groups, and that such valuations
are interdependent and changing over time. National identity is a type of social identity
that stands out because it seems to evoke extreme emotions and forms of behaviour that
only compare to religion. Moreover, national identity relies less than other types of social
identity (such as gender or race) on physical categories and more on everyday cultural
practise in the form of singing anthems, waving flags, or marching in parades. But when
and why did people begin to do this?
Our starting point is the idea, formulated by Alesina et al. (2019), that elites can
have an incentive to invest in policies to “homogenize” preferences in the population, e.g.
via schooling or state propaganda. But clearly, such policies are not always successful.
They can even backfire, see e.g. Fouka (2019). Moreover, the formation of national
identities in the early 19th century in many parts of Europe was not mainly about reducing
the cultural or geographical distance to some existing elite. It was rather about the
creation of an altogether new type of social identity, the collective imagination of a national
community (Anderson, 1983). To address these aspects, we suggest a simple modification
of Alesina et al. (2019). Here elites can invest in either homogenization or national identity
policies. Under quite general assumptions, the incentive to invest in identity policies rather
than in homogenization will be larger, the larger the cultural distance between elite and
population. If so, some event that would suddenly increase this distance could foster
identity policies, like some territorial change. Their success in turn would depend on the
level of cultural distance to the elite.
Based on this simple framework we analyze the origin of a German national identity
during the Napoleonic wars. There existed a German national movement since the last
third of the 18th century, carried by a new middle-class. But it was limited to small,
intellectual circles. Only after 1813, when the Prussian elites started to appeal openly
to national sentiments, did the movement spread to larger parts of society. Prussia had
suffered a devastating defeat against France in 1806. What is more, the French Revolution
had fundamentally shaken the legitimacy of the Ancien Regime, like the rule of the Hohen-
zollern over Prussia. In 1813 the Prussian elites adopted identity policies, not unlike those
of Napoleon, to enhance ideas of a German nation, e.g. using speeches, pamphlets and
theatre performances. They did so with the strategic aim to fight the French occupation,
to regain legitimacy, and in 1815 to integrate the Rhineland and Westphalia into their
enlarged territory.
We examine how changing exposure to Prussian identity policies during this time
led to the formation of national identities on a larger scale. Our empirical approach is a
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difference-in-difference framework at the level of families. We compare first names given
to children in cities that became Prussian in 1815 to names in cities that stayed outside
Prussia. In 1815 Prussia had gained large territories in the West, against her own intention,
but due to a British intervention at the Congress of Vienna (Huning and Wolf, 2019). To
elicit changes in identity within this setting, we focus on within family variation, which
helps us to control for unobservable family characteristics. Using a large new dataset on
name choices for families in 12 German cities, we show that exposure to Prussian policies
in 1815 had a strong causal effect to increase names of Germanic origin. We can show
that the same parents that neither had a national family tradition nor had given their
children German names before becoming a Prussian subject, were much more likely to do
so afterwards. However, we can also show that this effect depended on cultural distance
between treated cities and the Prussian elites. Finally, we provide evidence that national
first names had strong predictive power for individual behaviour. Hence, tracking first
names is indeed a valid way to elicit the emergence and spread of a national identity. Men
and women with national names in all German cities between 1800 and 1875 were more
likely to marry a partner that also had a national given name. And men with national
first names were more likely to be actively involved in the 1870/71 Franco-German war
and the First World War and more likely to receive a medal for bravery.
Our setting in Germany in the early 19th century is attractive for several reasons.
First, it has been argued that in difference to France or England, the formation of a German
national identity preceded the establishment of a nation state by several decades (Schulze,
1985, p. 58ff.). The Prussian elites appealed to ideas of a German nation for strategic
reasons, which later helped to form a German nation state under Prussian leadership.
Second, 19th century Germany provides the researcher with a wealth of variety in terms
of polities, geography, religious, ethnic and economic differences. This stems from the fact
that the political unification of Germany was a slow process, which arguably started with
Napoleon but was not finished until 1871. Third, German national identity is notorious for
fostering – towards the end of the century – an aggressive nationalism, which contributed
to the outbreak of the Great War and the ensuing rise of the NSDAP.
The major challenge for any historical study on social identity is empirical measure-
ment. Our theoretical framework makes predictions about the effect of policies on the
identity of individuals and individual behaviour. Identity can be seen as a latent variable,
which in a historical context cannot be elicited by opinion polls or lab experiments. Also,
there is little evidence to be gained from voting behaviour as the political franchise was
very limited and voting infrequent. Hence, we have to find a way to capture identities
indirectly, via choices that people made at their time. These choices should be observable
at the individual level, they should have an obvious relation to identity and they should be
frequent. Following earlier suggestions from historical sociology, notably Gleitze (1962),
Lieberson and Bell (1992), Gerhards (1997), and Wolffsohn and Brechenmacher (1999),
we will elicit social identities and their changes over time by the type of first names that
parents gave their children. We classify names based on the philological five-volume com-
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pendium on German first names by Seibicke (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2007) into German
national, religious, European, ancient and ruler first names.
Such an approach relies on two main assumptions. First, we need to assume that
the choice of given names reflects the value that parents place on membership in a specific
social group. Second, the valuation of parents needs to be at least partly transmitted to
their children, be it directly by the parents themselves via education or indirectly, via their
social environment. Both assumptions find very broad support from the recent literature
on first names that also uses first names to capture social identity (Fryer and Levitt, 2004;
Head and Mayer, 2008; Cook et al., 2014; Abramitzky et al., 2019; Fouka, 2019). Still, it
is difficult to rule out various confounding factors that also might account for the name
choices of parents, such as differences in education, social status or individual traditions
of parents. This is a problem for modern data, but more so in a historical setting with
limited data on control variables. To deal with this, we go beyond the existing literature in
several ways. We systematically exclude all parents that had national names themselves
and use for the remaining parents only variation in the type of name choice made by
the same parents over time. Hence, we only need to assume that unobserved parent-level
factors remain constant as long as the mother was in child-bearing age. Our evidence on
the predictive power of first name type for the behaviour of children further suggests that
name choice can indeed capture identity.
Our study is related to theoretical approaches in economics that aim to explain the
formation of social identities. A common starting point is that individuals value their
perceived distance from specific group prototypes, as suggested by Akerlof and Kran-
ton (2000). Building on this, several authors have suggested mechanisms to account for
changes in perceived distance and group status. The most prominent idea is to distinguish
between an “elite” - a small group of agents with exogenous preferences (and identity) -
and a larger group of agents with endogenous preferences. The elite can use policies and
institutions such as pamphlets, state celebrations or schools to shape the preferences of
the population (Alesina et al., 2017, 2019). Arguments along these lines rely on the as-
sumption that elites have both, an incentive to form a specific social identity among the
population and the capacity to influence identities. We contribute to this by modifying
the framework by Alesina et al. (2019), such that elites can chose between policies to
foster “national identity” and alternatives. Moreover, we show that the success of such
policies will depend on the characteristics of the population. Another approach considers
technological and economic change as a driver of identity change. In the literature on
evolutionary cultural transmission, social traits simply spread between generations in line
with reproductive success, and hence are fully determined by economic factors (Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman, 1981). In contrast, Bisin and Verdier (2001) show that the long-run
outcomes depend crucially on whether cultural transmission within and outside the family
are substitutes. Gellner (1983) argues that industrialization, accompanied by large-scale
migration from villages to cities and the need for standardization devalued old regional
identities and contributed to the rise of a new broader “national identity”. Related, Shayo
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(2009) develops a model, where group status depends among other things on relative in-
come and perceived distances from group prototypes. Here, income growth and improved
communication can lead to the spread of a “national identity”, first among the middle-
class and later among the poor (Shayo, 2009, p.156). In our study we show that exposure
to elite policies matters, but also that its success will depend on characteristics of the
population.
Next, the previous empirical literature has shown the impact of different dimensions
of identity change on individual behavior (Hoff and Pandey, 2006; Benjamin et al., 2010,
2016). Battu and Zenou (2010) and Manning and Roy (2010) investigate determinants of
identity formation. However, causal evidence on the determinants of changes of identity
formation is scarce. A the notable exception is Fouka (2019), who provides evidence
that forced assimilation policies in several US states that targeted the German minority
backfired and led to less integration. We add to this literature evidence on the origin
and spread of a “national identity”for the 19th century, when arguably for the first time in
history national identity became a mass phenomenon. Moreover, we improve identification
using variation within families. We also provide an explanation for why identity policies
are sometimes successful, and sometimes not.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: we explain our theoretical framework in
section 2. In section 3 we introduce the historical background to our study on the origins
of a national identity in Germany. In section 4 we present and discuss our empirical
strategy with the main identifying assumptions and the data we use. Section 5 contains
our results on the treatment of 1815 for between and within family variation, including
various robustness checks. We show that first names have strong predictive power for
individual behaviour in section 6, where we first discuss evidence from marriage behaviour
and next behaviour during the wars of 1870/71 and 1914/18. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
When would elites have an incentive to manipulate the identity of their population? To
guide our empirical analysis, we suggest a simple modification of the model by Alesina
et al. (2019). A ruling elite faces a heterogeneous population, with individuals located at
distance di from the location of the elite (the “capital”). Individual i’s utility is given by
ui = g(1− di a
λ1
) + λ2 + y − r (1)
The first term g(1− di · a) measures the perceived value of the government to individual
i. The parameter g is the maximum utility an individual receives from the government at
distance zero, where di is individual i’s preference distance from the government. Following
Alesina et al. (2019), distance can reflect geographical distance but also language, cultural,
ideological difference between the individual and the public goods and policies provided
by the government. The parameter a measures the cost of this distance. The term y
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captures income (exogenously given), and r stands for taxes, which are split as lump sum
tax between all individuals in the country. With increasing returns to scale (or scope) in
the provision of public goods, the basic trade-off for any individual will be one between
the benefits from size and the cost of heterogeneity. In a larger state individuals can
benefit from cheaper provision of public goods but might suffer from higher (geographical
or ideological) distance from their provision.
In (1) we have extended the model by Alesina et al. (2019) by assuming that the
government (or elite) can chose between two types of identity policies, captured by the
parameters λ1 and λ2. The government can either invest in specific homogenization policies
λ1 as in Alesina et al. (2019), or invest in a common “national” identity λ2. The first
type of policies would be aimed at reducing the distance to the existing elite directly.
Examples would be infrastructure investment, but also specific education policies aimed
at reducing the perceived distance to the government, such as history classes that glorify
the ruling elite. We modify the model to introduce a second type of policies λ2. These
are attempts to create a new type of virtual public good, meant to reduce the relevance of
any existing differences between individuals and the ruling elite. Examples would include
propaganda against some common enemy, the invention of a common past between elite
and all members of society, or the celebration of a national holiday.
Intuitively, the incentive for the elite to invest in either type of policy will depend
on the cost of pursuing them (c1, c2), the cost of distance a, and the extent of economies
of scale in providing public goods (see appendix). It is easy to show that both types of
policies are substitutes, but not perfect ones. In particular, the benefit from pursuing
“national” identity policies λ2 instead of homogenization policies λ1 is increasing in a, the
cost of cultural distance between individuals and the elite. As we show in the appendix,
an exogenous increase in distance d would have an equivalent effect to an increase in a.
In our context, the defeat of the Prussian army at the battle of Jena-Auerstedt
1806, or the spread of republican and anti-monarchist sentiment could have alienated the
Prussian elite from their population. The Prussian elite would thereby have an incentive to
invest in “national identity”. The gain of new territories in 1815 should have further added
to this incentive. Here, the authorities faced the challenge to establish the legitimacy of
their rule and win the support of new populations that were geographically and culturally
even further apart from the centre of the state.
To summarize, our framework delivers three testable hypotheses:
1. We expect to see that after a crisis of legitimacy or territorial gains elites will invest
in the invention of a new “identity” rather than homogenization.
2. These policies should change individual identities towards national values.
3. Assuming a common level of optimal investment but a heterogeneous population,
individuals will differ in their responsiveness to such policies depending on their
distance to the elite.
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We want to test these hypotheses in the context of Germany after 1800, where we
observe for the first time that ideas of a German nation were spreading beyond small
circles of intellectuals. In particular, we use the expansion of Prussian territory in 1815 as
a shock to population heterogeneity, which was not anticipated (Huning and Wolf, 2019).
We predict that in the new territories the Prussian elites intensified their efforts of nation
building, both compared to other Prussian cities and to the efforts of nation building
in other German cities outside of Prussia. In particular we predict that the Prussian
government would have attempted to create a new narrative of the Prussian monarchy
linked to a new “German” identity, instead of simple pro-Prussian propaganda. Moreover,
we predict that some individuals will have responded to this and develop a new German
identity. Finally, these responses will have been weaker the larger the cultural distance
to the Prussian elite. The next section present historical background and first descriptive
evidence on this.
3 Historical background
Our empirical study is focused on the years when the German national movement for
the first time began to spread beyond small circles. To understand the historical context
we will briefly describe the political situation at the time. Next we will discuss why the
Prussian state had temporarily a strategic interest to appeal to national sentiment, and
what policies were used to shape identities.
In the last third of the 18th century, the Holy Roman Empire with the Emperor
in Vienna still existed, but it was little more than an empty shell. The German lands
were fragmented into several hundred territories ruled by various competing dynasties,
church territories and free city states. The two leading powers were Habsburg and Prussia,
both comprising large territories outside the Empire, and both striving for a more or less
enlightened type of absolutist state. The dynasties of Habsburg-Lorraine and Hohenzollern
had expanded their rule to the East and South, and around 1789 both states encompassed
quite heterogeneous populations in terms of languages, religious denominations or levels of
urbanization. A the same time, the old feudal order, with a division of power between the
ruler and the estates was being replaced by a centralization of power, with an absolutist
ruler supported by a modernized state bureaucracy.
This centralization of political power was, according to Schulze (1985, p. 240),
accompanied in many societies in Europe by a crisis of loyalty, where old identities were
destabilized due to political, economic and cultural change. The dramatic events in Amer-
ica 1776 and France 1789 intensified this loyalty crisis and were initially greeted by many
intellectuals on the continent as the beginning of a new era. However, the initial enthusi-
asm quickly gave way to anti-French feelings. The occupation of large parts of Germany
did not only foster modernization, e.g. by eliminating many small states, but also led
to large and growing burden in terms of taxes and conscription for the war. Especially
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the self-coronation of Napoleon as Emperor in 1804 and the humiliating defeat of Prus-
sia in 1806 sparked a new type of German national sentiment, that was geared against
the French occupation. Around the same time in Berlin formed a patriotic circle that in-
cluded the publisher Georg Andreas Reimer, as well as Ernst Moritz Arndt, Friedrich Jahn,
Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Prusssian officer August von Gneisenau (Bartmußet al.,
2008). Notably Jahn became prominent as founder of the German gymnastics movement
(“Turnbewegung”) in 1811, which shortly spread to other German states and became the
organizational backbone of the early national movement (Du¨ding, 1984). Ernst Moritz
Arndt wrote very popular pamphlets and poems such as “Was ist des deutschen Vater-
land?” (1814), which claimed all territory where German was spoken for a new German
national state.
But the national movement remained very small, and the authorities in the various
German states hesitated to support it. Some states, like Prussia in 1806, had lost not
only their independence and military power but also large parts of their territory, while
others like Bavaria had been compensated for a loss of independence by territorial gains
and upgraded status.1 Moreover, the aristocracy all over Europe feared the liberal and
revolutionary tendency among the national movements, as they could easily turn against
their privileges, wealth, and indeed their life. Within this tension, a group of reformers
among the Prussian elite realized that the national and anti-French sentiment could be
used to the benefit of the Prussian state. A key motive was the mobilization of people
for a levee en masse against the occupation. Already in 1797, Gerhard Scharnhorst, then
officer in Hanover, observed that the French army had an advantage due to the messianic
fighting spirit of the French soldiers. They were much more motivated to fight than the
mercenaries or conscripted soldiers of regular troops (Do¨rner, 1995, p. 112). In 1801
Scharnhorst left Hanover to become an officer in the Prussian army. He worked as a
military instructor, founded the Berlin Military Academy and quickly became influential,
together with his disciples von Clausewitz and von Gneisenau. After the humiliating peace
of Tilsit in 1807 he was promoted to major-general and led the effort of a fundamental
reform of the Prussian army. He introduced new recruitment systems to circumvent the
limitations imposed on Prussia since 1807 and strengthened the ties between army and
population, e.g. by opening the career path of officers to non-noble families.
After Napoleons defeat in Russia in late 1812, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and other
reformers convinced the king of Prussia, Frederick William III to side with Russia (treaty
of Kalisch, February 1813) and finally appeal to patriotism and the national movement.
As a first step towards this, in February 1813 the king decreed that every man above
20 had to wear in public the national cockade as a sign of their patriotism (Hagemann,
2019, p.165). Next, when Prussia declared war to France in March 1813, the king made a
proclamation “To my people”, where he appealed for the very first time to national pride
of “Germans and Prussians” to fight-off the foreign occupation. This proclamation was
1With French support, the Prince-elector Maximilian was crowned King Maximilian I. of Bavaria in
January 1806.
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published as a pamphlet and as an article in the leading newspaper of Breslau (today
Wroclaw, where the king resided in 1813), and sent to all postal offices of Prussia at the
time. Also in March 1813 the king established the Iron Cross, a new military decoration
to be awarded for bravery without regard to rank nor social status.
The battle of Leipzig in October 1813 brought the military success over France
that Prussia had hoped for, but the monarchy still had to face major challenges. At the
international peace congress in Vienna 1814/15 Prussia had aimed for an annexation of the
Kingdom of Saxony. Instead, due to a British intervention, Prussia gained large territories
in the West (the Rhineland and Westfalia), which were disconnected from the Prussian
mainland and had a predominantly catholic and often urban population (Huning and
Wolf, 2019). This stood in contrast to the more rural and protestant Prussian mainlands
and the protestant monarch Frederick William III himself. The main cities in the new
territories like Cologne, Muenster, or Aachen had very different traditions as either free
cities or catholic Prince-Bishoprics.
Hence, after the new territories had been formally incorporated into the Prussian
state in 1815, the authorities faced the challenge to establish the legitimacy of their rule
and win the support of their new population. A main instrument for this were royal
proclamations and the official homage ceremonies, which took place in 1815. Characteristic
for them was the attempt to create a new narrative with the king of Prussia leading the
German nation. In the proclamation of 5 April 1815 to the inhabitants of the “Rhine-
lands unified with the Prussian monarchy” the king Frederick Wilhelm III states that at
the congress of Vienna he agreed to the burden of defending the “endangered borderlands”
out of respect for the “unified German fatherland” (Kotulla, 2010, p.591). Moreover, he
gives the people of the Rhineland back to their “German fatherland and to an old German
princely family“ (Kotulla, 2010, p.591), and promises to honor their religion. This is in
line with our first hypothesis: territorial change can provide elites with an incentive to
invest into the invention of a “new identity”.
In the same spirit, the Prussian authorities organized homage ceremonies in the
newly gained territories, which stood in the tradition of medieval homage to the ruler, yet
added quite explicitly a new element of national identity (Schwengelbeck, 2007, p.136ff).
The ceremony for the Rhineland took place in Aachen on 15 May 1815, the ceremony for
Westphalia in Muenster on 18 October 1815. The decision for Aachen was a reference to
the former residence of Charlemagne. As General Gneisenau and Governor Sack stated in
their official announcement, the city was chosen because “only the city of Aachen unites
age, grandeur and suitable local with the dignity of a coronation city for the most elevated
German rulers, where after Charlemagne no less than 35 German Emperors were crowned”
(cited after Tschacher, 2010, p.259). The date in turn coincided with Pentecost, which had
been abolished under French rule but was now being reintroduced as a religious holiday.
The choice of date for the second ceremony in Muenster was a very explicit reference to
national identity: it coincided with the second anniversary of the battle of Leipzig, which
already then played a pivotal role for the collective memory, mainly due to the publications
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by Ernst Moritz Arndt and Friedrich Jahn (Hagemann, 2002, p.481f). The orchestration
for both ceremonies was similar: they were extended over several days and included the
celebration of a mass in the cathedral, processions, fireworks, official banquets, feeding
of the poor and theatre performances. Importantly, in both cases the authorities had
invited representatives of all parts of society, including the nobility, clergy, burghers and
peasants. For Aachen, there was also a common dress-code, where all civilians were obliged
to wear black dress and the national cockade (Tschacher, 2010, p.259). In Aachen, the play
“Deutsche Treue” by August Klingemann was performed, which placed the unification of
the Rhineland with Prussia in the context of the reconciliation between Frederick the Fair
of Austria and Louis IV (the Bavarian) in 1325 after their struggle for the German crown.
Afterwards, the celebrations were popularized in a flood of pamphlets and newspaper
articles, most prominently a serial written by Ernst Moritz Arndt (Tschacher, 2010, p.267).
The celebration in Muenster a few months later was quite similar, but here the
association between the king of Prussia and a new German identity was made even more
explicit. The festivities took place over several days, they were elaborate and rather
expensive (Lahrkamp, 1976, p.128). Apart from the fact that the date, exactly two years
after the battle of Leipzig was a clear reference to the idea of a “German nation”, the
chosen theatre play “Der Altar im Walde” made it even more obvious. Here, the king of
Prussia is called the new Hermann, the legendary chieftain of the Germanic Cherusci tribe
who fought the Roman invasion. The topic had been popularised as an allegory to the
French occupation since Arndt asked in 1805 for a “new Hermann” to fight Napoleon and
Heinrich von Kleist’s drama “Die Hermannsschlacht” (1808). Now in Muenster 1815, king
Frederick Wilhelm III is depicted as the new Hermann, saviour of the German nation. The
author of the play was Wilhelm Aschenberg, a lutheran pastor and writer from the nearby
city of Hagen. In 1814 Aschenberg had founded the journal “Hermann” that propagated
ideas of a pro-Prussian German nationalism, along the lines that would suit the Prussian
government. As in the case of Aachen, the celebration was followed by several articles in
newspapers and special publications (e.g. a commemoration book published by Joh. B.
Bodde in 1816), to spread the word.
Hence, the Prussian authorities clearly attempted to create a new narrative to show
the king of Prussia as the leader of the German nation, particularly in the new provinces
in line with the first hypothesis from our theoretical framework. Their intention was
purely strategic, with the aim to use the broader idea of a German nation to turn the
new population into loyal subjects of the king of Prussia. And indeed, already from 1818,
when the territorial order was established did the Prussian authorities try to silence the
national movement again. But to what extent did their strategy succeed in 1815? How
can we test if individuals that experienced these celebrations in 1815 or had heard and
read about these events, actually changed their identity, and behaviour?
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4 Empirical Strategy and Data
In order to determine the causal effect of Prussian policies in 1815 on the formation of
national identities (our second hypothesis), we use evidence on families in a differences-
in-differences framework, and exploit within-family variation.2
Our treated families live in Aachen (in the Rhineprovince) and Hagen (in West-
phalia), two cities that become part of Prussia in 1815. Our control group consists of
families who live in Mannheim, Heidelberg, Hanover and Frankfurt, i.e. cities that were
not part of Prussia. To estimate the causal effect of becoming part of Prussia on “iden-
tity” we use first names that parents decided to give their children in different cities and
at different points in time. We assume here that the choice of given names reflects the
value that parents place on membership in a specific social group. We also assume the
valuation of parents needs to be at least partly transmitted to their children, be it directly
by the parents themselves via education or indirectly, via their social environment. Both
assumptions find very broad support from the recent literature on first names that also
uses first names to capture social identity (Fryer and Levitt, 2004; Head and Mayer, 2008;
Cook et al., 2014; Abramitzky et al., 2019; Fouka, 2019).
The two cities in our treatment, Aachen and Hagen, provide us with variation re-
garding distance to the elite (our third hypothesis). In 1815 Aachen was a predominantly
catholic city, in difference to the protestant mainlands of Prussia, whereas Hagen was pre-
dominantly protestant. The city of Aachen had played an outstanding role in the history
of the old Holy Roman Empire, as the place where the Emperor was crowned German
king until 1531. The city was an Imperial free city until the French occupation in 1794,
and became Prussian in 1815. The town of Hagen had a less glorious past. Importantly,
Hagen as a settlement in the county of Mark became part of Brandenburg-Prussia from
1666 onwards. It received town rights in 1746, and started to grow. In 1807 the Mark
and with it the city of Hagen passed from Prussia to France before it returned to Prussia
in 1815. Hence, we would expect to see that efforts of any type of identity policy by the
Prussian elite might meet a more fertile ground in Hagen compared to Aachen, as the two
cities differed significantly in terms of their cultural distance to Prussia. Note that territo-
rial change as such will not explain our findings, because during our period of observation
this affected both, cities in our treatment group and in the control group.
However, just comparing the frequency of name choices in treated versus non-treated
cities could be misleading. There is a host of confounding factors that might also account
for the name choices of parents, such as differences in education, social status or individual
traditions of parents. This is a problem for modern data, but more so in a historical setting
with limited data on control variables. We address these problems by systematically
2Previous literature using within–family variation focused on the quantity-quality trade-off for fertility
decisions. Multiple births and preferences for balanced gender composition are used in this research as
instruments for fertility (Angrist et al., 2010; Black et al., 2005; Ca´ceres-Delpiano, 2006; Rosenzweig and
Zhang, 2009).
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excluding all parents that had national names themselves. Moreover, our data allows us to
use family-fixed effects: we use for the remaining parents only variation in the type of name
choice made by the same parents over time. This implies that we restrict our attention on
families who get at least one children before and after the treatment. Exploiting within–
family variation has several main advantages. First, this strategy allows us to control for
all time–invariant family characteristics. Second, we only compare families in similar age
groups as we are only interested in those families that get children in the years before and
after the specific year. Third, we can rule out that migration into Prussian cities drive
our results because we only consider families who already live in the respective city before
the treatment year and stay there after the treatment.
We use the following differences-in-differences estimation employing an OLS model3:
NationalNamefct = αf + θt +
∑1824
t=1805
βt(TreatedCityc · Y eart) + fct (2)
NationalNamefct is a dummy variable for a national first name in family f in city c
at time t. Our dependent variable has the value of 1 only when a child is given a national
first name, and zero otherwise. αf are family fixed effects and θt year fixed effects. The
coefficient of interest is βt that indicates the effect of living in a treated city in Y eart
year. With this specification, we control for time invariant family characteristics as well
as more general time trends. The variation we exploit only comes from families who either
change from a non-national first name to national first name for their children or vice
versa. We allow β to vary over time and thus are able to control for potential treatments.
As second specification, we follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) to control for serial
auto-correlation and collapse our sample in a pre- and post-treatment period:
NationalNamefct = αf + β(TreatedCityc · Post1815) + γPost1815 + fct, (3)
where Post1815 equals to 1 for the post-treatment period and 0 otherwise. The coefficient
of interest in β. We will use this as our main specification and discuss the credibility of
our approach in the following section. Our dependent variable equals to 1 if a family has
at least one child with national first name in one period. In addition, we use similar and
less restrictive specifications where we use city fixed effects instead of family fixed effects.
With this less restrictive approach we have much more observations, but a less-clear-cut
identification and obviously a lack of control variables.
The identifying assumption in this setting implies that the decisions by parents
regarding first names in cities that become part of Prussia and in cities that do not
become part of Prussia would follow the same trend in absence of the treatment. We will
show that indeed is the case for our treatment analysis. Given the course of events after
the defeat of Napoleon in 1813/14, and Prussia’s negotiations at the congress of Vienna
(Huning and Wolf, 2019), the territorial change that occurred in 1815 was difficult to
3Note that we present results using a Logit model as robustness.
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anticipate.
In order to measure national identity using first names, we use several new data
sets, which we will describe in the following. Moreover, we introduce our way to classify
the first names into different social categories.
Birth Registers of German Cities Our main data is based on births registers for 12
German cities based on city archives and several genealogy websites, which we had typed
in. Thereby, we construct a sample with almost 1.2 million observations. For these births,
we have the following information: first and last name for children and their parents, as
well as place and year of birth of the children.
Table B.1 in the Appendix provides an overview about our data set, including the
date the city became part of the Kingdom of Prussia. Note, that we have four different
groups within our sample: first, cities like Berlin that belonged to the Kingdom of Prussia
throughout the 19th century. Second, cities in Westphalia and the Rhine Province that
became part of Prussia after the Peace of Vienna in 1815. Third, cities that became part
of Prussia after the Prussia-Austria War in 1866. Fourth, cities that belonged to the
German Empire after its foundation in 1871. We exploit this variance in terms of national
allegiances later in our empirical analysis.
For our main identification strategy based on within-family variation, we construct
a common family ID for children with the same parents based on the first name of the
father, the first letter of the first name of the mother, and the last names of father and
mother.
In the case of Aachen, we have to conduct some adjustments due to the French
occupation since 1794. The French bureaucracy probably “francicised” many German
names, although we have no direct evidence on this (Kramer, 1993, p.225). In the case of
the parents’ first names, this is straightforward as it is unlikely that the parents were given
French names in late 18th century Aachen before the French occupation. Thus, we use the
German translation of the French first names (e.g. Guillaume/Wilhelm). Reassuringly, we
get a better matching of the family IDs, as we find many more couples with the same family
name and matching first names before and after 1815. For the children, however, this
becomes more complicated because we do not know whether parents adjusted to the new
rulers by choosing French first names or instead the French administration “francicised”
the German names. Such adjustments are potentially important for our results. If we do
not use the German versions of the French names for children born between 1794 and 1814,
we might underestimate the share of Germanic first names for the pre-treatment period
and thus potentially overestimate our treatment effect. To circumvent this problem, we
present the results for both, the unadjusted and the most “conservative” option. In the
conservative option, we assume that the French administration systematically “francicised”
German first names. We lack direct evidence on this, but if anything this introduces a
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bias against us finding a treatment effect.4 Note that we do not face a similar problem
for families in the city of Hagen.
Our data set on families also allows us to trace the first names of marrying couples
over time and in different parts of Germany, conditional on them having children. We will
use this below as one piece of evidence (among others) on the predictive power of name
types for individual behaviour.
Loss Lists and Honored Soldiers from Wars Furthermore, we collect data from
loss lists and lists with honored soldiers. We use this data to show the “predictive power”
of national first names. More specifically, we use the digitalized German loss lists for the
German-French War in 1871 as well as World War I provided by Verein fu¨r Computer-
genealogie (2014). The loss lists include information about the first and last name, the
location, the regiment, the year the soldier was listed on the loss list, and contain around
160.000 entries for the German-French War in 1870/71 and more than 8.5 million entries
for World War I. The loss lists indicate not only participation in the war, but active par-
ticipation, as they refer to soldiers that were either killed, wounded, captured or went
missing. However, none of these events needs to reflect voluntary behaviour of soldiers.
In order to capture voluntary engagement during wars, we use lists with honored
soldiers. For the German-French War from 1870/71, we digitalize the names of all 1295
soldiers honored with the Eiserne Kreuz (Ko¨nigliche General-Ordens-Kommission, 1878)
and categorize them based on four status groups. For World War I, we rely on Ophaus
(1936). His book provides information on all non-commissioned officers (Unteroffiziere)
who were honored with the preußische goldene Milita¨r-Verdienst-Kreuz which was the
highest honor for soldiers with this rank. Overall, 1773 soldiers got this award during
World War I.5 The basic idea here is that the distinction of soldiers for bravery should be
a much better indicator for voluntary behavior than active war participation as reflected
on the loss list. We might expect that soldiers with a strong national(ist) identity would
be more willing to fight and hence more likely to receive the Iron Cross than others. If
Germanic first names would be a good predictor for national identity, we expect to find a
positive correlation between names and honors.
Classification To classify the first names in general and national first names in partic-
ular, we use a five volume encyclopedia on German first names from Seibicke (1996, 1998,
2000, 2002, 2007). We classify all first names that come up at least 300 times in the 19th
century. By doing so, we capture around 95% of all entries in our sample. We differentiate
between national, religious, European and ancient first names. To make sure that we
only measure these facets of identity and not conflated parts of identity, we furthermore
4For instance, we do not observe a break in our data once the French administration left Aachen in
January 1814.
5Ideally, we would have the first names of the volunteers in World War I. According to some estimates,
around 260.000 soldiers volunteered in August 1914. However, these lists were destroyed in World War II.
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account for family and ruler tradition. We measure family tradition by counting those
who have the same first name as their parents and we account for ruler tradition with first
names from local rulers during their tenure as well as Friedrich and Wilhelm as rulers of
Prussia for cities that were part of Prussia throughout the 19th century.
We count those first names as Germanic whose origin lies in old high German (al-
thochdeutsch) or germanic (germanisch) language, according to Seibicke. We cross check
our list of national first names with a book from Khull (1909) published around 1900 that
aimed to increase the consciousness for Germanic first names in order make sure that the
names on our list had a nationalist connotation around 1900. The most popular national
first names can be found in Table B.2 in the Appendix. Note, that the distribution of the
frequencies for the first names is highly unequal, even more so for men where a four first
names (Carl/Karl, Friedrich, Heinrich and Wilhelm) make up about 25% of all males in
our sample.
In the Appendix in Figure B.5, we apply these steps to our data and summarize
the shares for each city to give an overview of the trends in Germany throughout the
19th century. Religious first names have the highest share among our groups. Figure B.4
shows the development of the shares of national first names from 1810 to 1874 conditional
on family tradition and ruler first names. We observe an strong upward trend especially
between 1810 and 1830. Afterwards, the share of national first names slowly increases.
In addition, we observe also a steady increase in the share of Hermann and Ernst, two
prominent nationalist first names not related to rulers, among boys (also in Figure B.4).
This descriptive analysis provides first evidence that the first decades of the 19th century
were indeed crucial for the spread of national identity in Germany. Moreover, we see that
the share of national first names increase which fits to the historiography according to
which national identity becomes more salient over the 19th century.
5 The Effect of Nation-Building
As a first result, we show the development of the share of national first names in our
treated and control cities in Appendix Figure B.3. The share of national first names
slightly increases from around 5% to 8% in our control cities, whereas the share of national
first names more than doubles from 12% to around 20% in the treated cities.
Before presenting the results for our regressions, we present evidence in Appendix
Figures B.1 and B.2 and in Appendix Table B.3 on the common trend assumption. The
coefficients based on equation 2 (with 1814 as reference year) for the pre-treatment period
are all statistically insignificant, independent whether we rely on city or family fixed effects.
Between 1811 and 1814, we see quite some variation in the point estimates (especially
in case we use family fixed effects), however, no upward trend is visible. Overall, this
suggests that the common trend assumption holds for our estimation despite losing a lot
of observations because this step only includes families that have at least one children
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before and after 1815.
The results from a difference-in-difference regression using city fixed effects confirm
this impression (Table 1 column 1). The coefficients are positive and significant. The result
holds after controlling for family fixed effects (column 3). The point estimate suggests that
families in treated cities choose a national first name for their child with a 30 percentage
point higher probability. The event study graphs (Figures B.1 and B.2) show the yearly
effects. Using city effects the effect size remains stable over time (with 1816 as the only
non-significant result). The point estimates of our preferred regression exploiting only
within-family variation seem to decline over time. Note that the standard errors are quite
large, likely due to the small sample size for each year.
In a next step, we allow for heterogeneous effects for our two treated cities, Aachen
and Hagen, to account for the difference in terms of “cultural distance” to Prussia. We
find strong positive effects for both cities, especially Aachen in column 2 and 4 in Table
1. We discuss the issue of “francicised” first names in Aachen when we discuss several
robustness checks.
Table 1: Treatment Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Dummy National First Name
DiD Coefficient...
...overall 0.0869∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗
(5.74) (3.99)
...Aachen 0.0688∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗
(23.97) (13.71)
...Hagen 0.107∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(37.40) (7.48)
After 1815 0.0350∗∗∗ 0.0350∗∗∗ 0.0939∗∗ 0.0939∗∗
(12.21) (12.20) (3.32) (3.32)
City FE X X
Family FE X X
Mean Dep. Var. 0.1936 0.1936 0.1936 0.1936
Observations 77328 77328 2422 2422
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. We only include parents without
national first given name. Clustered standard errors at the city level. Treated
cities: Aachen and Hagen. Control cities: Frankfurt (Main), Hannover, Hei-
delberg, and Mannheim. Results based on equation 3.
Further Robustness As further robustness checks, we use a Logit estimation in Ap-
pendix Table B.4 to account for a dummy variable as dependent variable. The results
remain highly significant and positive.
Next, we further restrict our analysis conditional on family tradition, i.e. we ex-
clude families that choose a middle name from the parents as first name of the child in
Appendix Table B.5, Panel 1. The coefficient of interest slightly declines, but remains
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highly significant.
We also test whether the effect may only be due to a specific Prussian “ruler” effect.
Therefore, we exclude all children named Wilhelm after 1815 in Panel 2 in Appendix Table
B.5. Our results only change slightly.
The identity policies in 1815 in the new provinces were location-specific as discussed
in section 2 above, and should have affected the centre less than the treated cities. There-
fore, we use in Panel 3 of appendix Table B.5 Berlin as control group. As before, we find
a strong treatment effect for families in Hagen and Aachen.
However, the strong result for Aachen crucially depends on how we adjust for “fran-
cicised” names before 1815. In Appendix Table B.6 we show that with a very conservative
adjustment, assuming that all first names were “francicised” and use the German transla-
tion thereof, the data suggests no positive treatment effects for Aachen and also no positive
overall effect. The effect for Hagen remains positive and highly significant.
Nation-building, 1866 Finally, consider the territorial expansion of Prussia in 1866,
when Frankfurt and Hanover became part of the Prussian state. In difference to 1815, the
enlargement of Prussia did not have the connotation of German unification, but rather of
Prussian power politics geared against the idea of a German national identity, especially
due to the German-Austrian War (Schulze, 1985, p.235f). Here, the incorporation of the
new population was not accompanied by a similar national propaganda as in 1815, so we
would expect to find no effect for the treated cities in 1866. Indeed, as shown in Table
B.7, we do not find similar positive treatment effects for 1866 when Frankfurt and Hanover
became part of Prussia. However, we see that the national idea was generally spreading
after 1866, albeit not related to Prussia.
To summarize, the empirical evidence supports our three hypotheses. First, we
find that after the challenges of 1806/07 the Prussian authorities clearly attempted to
create a new narrative to show the king of Prussia as the leader of the German nation. In
particular, they attempted to invent a new German identity in the new provinces in 1815 in
line with our first hypothesis. Next, we see that their success to affect individual identities
was mixed. We find an overall positive and significant treatment effect as documented in
column 1 and 3 in Table 1. Moreover, we always find very strong evidence for a positive
treatment effect for families in the city of Hagen. In this case, the effect remains strong
even after controlling for family fixed effects (which reduces the number of observations
in our sample from over 75000 to below 2500). This supports our second hypothesis,
namely that identity policies can indeed change individual identities. Our results for
Aachen are however less clear, as they depend on our assumption about the administrative
“francification” of first names. Hence, our evidence on the third hypothesis about the
relevance of cultural distance is ambiguous.
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6 The Behavioral Effects of First Names
So far, we provided evidence on the origins of national identity after the collapse of
Napoleon. However, we cannot infer from these results whether or to what extent na-
tional first names were also associated with nationalist behavior. The argument here is
not that national first names would change individual behaviour. Rather, we suggest that
national first names can reflect a social environment, which put a high value on national
identity and thereby helped to shape the identity and behaviour of a child. In order to
provide evidence for this idea, we look at the predictive power of national first names in
two arguably important and distinct aspects of life: marriage and war.
First Names and Marriages
Our data allows us to analyze whether parents with a national first name are more likely
to marry a person with a national first name. The basic idea is to test, whether two people
of different sex, living in the same city in the same year had a higher than random chance
to marry if both partners carried a national first name. If indeed names capture the social
environment in which children grow up, we should see that men and women sharing a name
type are more likely to marry compared to random matching. To this end, we compute
the actual and expected share of parents who both bear a national first name and test this
for statistical differences. We calculate the expected share of national marriages, based
on the share of men and women in a city at a point in time assuming random matching.
In Figure 1 we plot the ratio of actual over expected “national” couples, where both bear
a national first name (left axis). We show averages over all cities over time, based on
calculations for each city and year separately. We see substantial differences in the first
decades of the 19th century, which are declining but not disappearing thereafter. The early
differences are based on few observations, because national names were still rare, and more
so couples where both partners had a national first name. A possible interpretation for the
observed decline that follows is that the overall share of national names in the population
is increasing (right axis), such that the signalling function of the national name-type is
getting weaker. Overall, we interpret this finding as evidence for assortative mating based
on national identity.
First Names and Behavior in World War I
Next, we compare the first names of honored soldiers with all soldiers who appear on loss
lists of the First World War. By analyzing honored soldiers, we aim to capture strong
engagement during the German-French War in 1870/71 and World War I. Comparing the
loss lists and the honored soldiers in Table 2 shows overall substantial and statistically
significant differences. More specifically, we find differences between the share of national
first names for the soldiers on the loss lists and those who were awarded during the German-
French War in 1870/71, also if we condition the analysis on different hierarchy levels (panel
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Figure 1: National marriages, 1810-1874
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Note: Balanced panel for 1810-1874. Includes: Frankfurt (Main), Hannover, Nuernberg, Hagen, Berlin,
Aachen, Mannheim and Heidelberg.
1). Note that the differences are very sizeable. The difference in terms of the share of
national first names between Offiziere on Loss Lists and Award Lists is more than 30
percentage points. We find similarly large differences for other hierarchy levels. Analyzing
more specific national first names, we also find differences. Note that the relative difference
is more pronounced for Ernst and Hermann – well-known nationalist first names – than
for Friedrich and Wilhelm – names with strongly overlapping connotations, because these
were also the most prominent ruler first names of that time. For World War I, we have
sufficient data at the city level to compare first the frequency of names in the population,
next to the loss list and finally to honored soldiers (panel 3). Moreover, we can condition
on last names to improve the matching between our samples. We find similar results
compared to 1870/71: 44% of all soldiers on the loss lists have a national first names,
comparing to 51% of the awarded non-commissioned officers. Again, we can rule out that
the results are mainly driven by ruler first names like Friedrich and Wilhelm (panel 2).
We conclude form this that first names can indeed capture aspects of identity that
are relevant for individual behaviour, as documented for marriages and war participation.
Again, we do not claim that the names as such shape behaviour. Rather they reflect
circumstances or social environments that shape behaviour later on.
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Table 2: National First Names, War Participation, and War Decoration
Panel 1: German-French War 1870/71
Share national first names...
...Loss Lists ...Honored Soldiers t-Test
National First Names 0.309 0.553 17.739***
... General 0.190 0.604 14.106***
... Offiziere 0.200 0.532 20.503***
... Unteroffiziere 0.333 0.579 5.864***
... Mannschaft 0.314 0.625 2.489**
Friedrich & Wilhelm 0.109 0.140 3.243***
Ernst & Hermann 0.029 0.057 4.297***
Panel 2: Honored Soliers and World War I
Share national first names...
...Loss Lists ...Honored Soldiers t-Test
National First Names 0.441 0.512 5.9109***
Friedrich & Wilhelm 0.112 0.111 0.1239
Ernst & Hermann 0.055 0.064 1.5796*
Panel 3: Participation World War I
Share national first names...
City ...Loss Lists ...Honored Soldiers t-Test
No restrictions, national first names
Hannover 0.65 0.64 39924
Mannheim 0.36 0.48∗∗∗ 18806
Nu¨rnberg 0.31 0.37∗∗∗ 21555
No restrictions, national first names excluding ruler names
Hannover 0.23 0.27∗∗∗ 39924
Mannheim 0.12 0.18∗∗∗ 18806
Nu¨rnberg 0.10 0.17∗∗∗ 21555
Conditioning on last name, national first names
Hannover 0.65 0.65 29992
Mannheim 0.36 0.46*** 8175
Nu¨rnberg 0.31 0.37∗∗∗ 20985
Conditioning on last name, national first names excluding ruler names
Hannover 0.23 0.28∗∗∗ 29992
Mannheim 0.12 0.15∗∗∗ 8175
Nu¨rnberg 0.10 0.18∗∗∗ 20985
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we asked about the origins of national identity. We extended a model by
Alesina et al. (2019) to analyze how exposure to national identity policies had a causal ef-
fect on individual identity and consequences for behaviour. The model generated testable
hypotheses about the incentives of elites to use either homogenization or to invent a new
“national” identity in response to shocks, and the extent to which such policies should
be effective. To elicit changes in identity we used data on first names given in German
cities between 1800 and 1875. We have shown that the Prussian state indeed attempted to
create a “national” identity in the newly gained territories. We also showed that parents
in cities treated by nation building policies of the Prussian state in 1815 responded by
choosing first names of German origin for their children. To control for family-specific
confounding factors, we exploited within family variation. We also showed that Germanic
first names had remarkable predictive power for behaviour: individuals with Germanic
first names made different marriage choices and were more likely to get actively involved
and decorated during the German-French War in 1870/71 and the First World War. We
think that our approach can be easily applied to many other contexts. Using name choices
as indicators for identity change, and exploiting variation within families to control for
unobservable characteristics rests on data, which is available in many contemporary and
historical settings. Our findings based on the nation-building policies of Prussia around
1815 suggest that choices of first names react strongly to policy changes, and have remark-
able predictive power for individual behaviour.
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Appendix
A Theoretical Framework
When would elites have an incentive to invest in national identity? To guide our empirical
analysis, we suggest a simple modification of the model by Alesina et al. (2019). A ruling
elite faces a heterogeneous population, with individuals located at distance di from the
location of the elite (the “capital”). Individual i’s utility is given by
ui = g(1− di a
λ1
) + λ2 + y − r (A.1)
The first term g(1− di · a) measures the perceived value of the government to individual
i. The parameter g is the maximum utility an individual receives from the government at
distance zero, where di is individual i’s preference distance from the government. Following
Alesina et al. (2019), distance can be language, cultural, ideological difference between the
individual and the public goods and policies provided by the government. The parameter
a measures the cost of this distance. The term y captures income (exogenously given),
and r stands for taxes, which are split as lump sum tax between all individuals in the
country.
We extend the model by Alesina et al. (2019) by assuming that the government
(or elite) can chose between two types of identity policies, captured by the parameters
λ1 and λ2. The government can either invest in specific homogenization policies λ1 as in
Alesina et al. (2019), or in a new common “national” identity λ2. The first type of policies
would be aimed at reducing the distance to the existing elite directly. Examples would be
infrastructure investment, but also specific education policies that attempt to reduce the
perceived distance to the government, such as history classes that glorify the ruling elite.
We modify the model and introduce a second type of policies λ2. These are attempts to
create a new type of virtual common good, meant to reduce the relevance of any existing
differences between individuals and the ruling elite. Examples would include propaganda
against some common enemy, or the invention of a common past between elite and all
members of society.
For a country with mass 1, the government budget constraint is given by
r = k + c1 · λ1 + c2 · λ2 (A.2)
where k stands for the cost to provide the public good g, c1 and c2 are the cost to implement
policies λ1 and λ2, respectively. As in Alesina et al. (2019) we assume that the provision
of public goods features increasing returns. With this, we can rewrite the utility as
ui = g(1− di a
λ1
) + λ2 + y − (k + c1 · λ1 + c2 · λ2)
Consider some mass s (with 0 < s < 1) of individuals that are all located (geograph-
ically or ideologically) at distance is from the capital. Assume that these individuals are
able to separate from the capital and to form their own state. Hence individuals in s have
an outside option with utility
uoi = g + y − ro (A.3)
The government in a separate state would face a budget constraint of ro = ks , with
s < 1.
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With this, an elite that is trying to prevent the separation of region s will chose
policies λ1 and/or λ2 such that individuals in s prefer not to split:
g(1− dis a
λ1
) + λ2 + y − (k + c1 · λ1 + c2 · λ2) ≥ g + y − k
s
(A.4)
What is the optimal investment in homogenization policies (λ1), or national identity
policies (λ2)? After some simple manipulation we find that the solution for λ1 has the
form
λ∗1 =
z2 −
√
((z2)
2 − 4z1z3)
2z1
(A.5)
with z1 = c1, z2 = [(1− c2)λ2 + k(1−ss )], and z3 = g · dis · a.
The optimal level of investment in national identity (λ2) is given by
λ∗2 =
1
1− c2 [k(
s− 1
s
) + g · dis a
λ∗1
+ c1 · λ∗1] (A.6)
This expression will be positive as long as c2 < 1 and k(
s−1
s ) < g · dis aλ∗1 + c1 · λ
∗
1,
with s < 1. It is simple to show that the incentives to pursue either homogenization λ1
or national identity policies λ2 are increasing with the disutility from distance to the elite
(a), with distances dis and with size s of the separating region.
Moreover, the elite faces a trade-off between the two types of policies:
∂λ2
∂λ1
=
1
(1− c2) [c1 −
g · dis · a
λ21
] < 0, with c1 <
g · dis · a
λ21
(A.7)
In particular, we see from equation A.6 above that the incentive for the elite to invest
into a common “national” identity (λ2) increases with c1, the cost to pursue homogeniza-
tion policies λ1, and also with the disutility from distance to the elite (a). Finally, the
trade-off between investment in identity policies vs. homogenization policies (in equation
A.7) is increasing with the disutility from distance to the elite a. Equivalently, it is in-
creasing with distance dis of the separating region from the center. Put differently, for
a higher distance dis or disutility from distance (a), a given increase in national identity
investment is equivalent to a larger change in homogenization investment.
This has several interesting implications. For example, if the perceived distance from
the elite would increase (e.g. due to some failure of the elite, like a lost battle, corruption or
anti-monarchist sentiment against a ruling king), this will increase the incentive of the elite
to pursue policies of national identity λ2, more than the incentive to pursue the alternative,
homogenization policies λ1. In our context, both the defeat of the Prussian army at the
battle of Jena-Auerstedt 1806 and the spread of republican and anti-monarchist sentiment
in the wake of the French Revolution would have shifted (a) against the Prussian elite.
Related, the gain of a new, more distant territory, such as the Rhineland and Westphalia
in 1815 can trigger policies of national identity λ2 to prevent such a region from separating.
Finally, we see that such national policies would not always succeed to affect indi-
vidual utility and hence behavior. Rather their success should vary with distance from
the elite (e.g. in terms of religious, or language differences). If we assume two types of
individuals in region s with different cultural distance from the elite but the same outside
option, exposure to national identity policies by the elite could change the behavior of one
type sufficiently close to the elite, but not the behaviour of the other type, further away.
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B Tables and Figures
Table B.1: Data Set
City Province Prussia
since
Births Years
Berlin Brandenburg 1701 204.596 1804 - 1877
Stettin Pomerania 1720 78.253 1815 - 1877
Danzig West Prussia 1772 38.948 1824 - 1874
Aachen Rhine Province 1815 95.553 1800 - 1874
Crefeld Rhine Province 1815 92.788 1816 - 1875
Hagen Westphalia 1815 86.716 1800 - 1874
Hannover Hannover 1866 135.340 1800 - 1898
Frankfurt (Main) Hessen-Nassau 1866 81.699 1805 - 1875
Nu¨rnberg Kingdom of Bavaria 138.237 1810 - 1900
Mannheim Grand-Duchy of Baden 45.835 1800 - 1898
Heidelberg Grand-Duchy of Baden 131.857 1800 - 1898
Lu¨beck Hanseatic City of Lu¨beck 46.509 1818 - 1875
26
Table B.2: Popular national first names
Name Observations Top 30 Germanic Names
based on Seibicke (1996,
1998, 2000, 2002, 2007)
Top 30 Germanic
Names based on
Khull (1909)
Men
Carl 51941 X
Friedrich 35642 X X
Heinrich 33409 X X
Wilhelm 22550 X X
Karl 13283 X X
Ernst 10836 X X
Hermann 10340 X X
Ludwig 8356 X X
Otto 6550 X X
Albert 6177 X X
Theodor 4667 X
Adolph 4151 X X
Richard 3869 X X
Robert 3185 X X
Hubert 2824 X X
Women
Caroline 13083 X
Wilhelmine 12572 X X
Emma 10544 X X
Bertha 7591 X X
Friederike 6645 X X
Ida 5444 X X
Mathilde 4184 X X
Carolina 3358 X
Wilhelmina 3276 X X
Gertrud 3273 X X
Minna 2575 X
Hedwig 2510 X X
Karoline 1978 X
Karolina 1958 X
Friedrike 1621 X X
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Table B.3: Flexible Diff-in-Diff
(1) (2)
Dep. Var. Dummy National First Name
Treated × 1805 -0.0219 -0.0280
(-0.62) (-0.36)
Treated × 1806 -0.0304 -0.0290
(-0.62) (-0.13)
Treated × 1807 -0.0115 0.0678
(-0.34) (0.38)
Treated × 1808 -0.00703 0.0337
(-0.18) (0.37)
Treated × 1809 -0.0126 -0.0394
(-0.29) (-0.40)
Treated × 1810 0.00113 0.109
(0.07) (0.81)
Treated × 1811 0.00997 -0.0424
(0.79) (-0.43)
Treated × 1812 0.0173 0.0401
(1.62) (0.51)
Treated × 1813 0.0137 0.131∗
(1.03) (2.10)
Treated × 1815 0.0773∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗
(9.16) (16.46)
Treated × 1816 0.0605 0.205
(1.29) (1.18)
Treated × 1817 0.0712∗∗∗ 0.268∗
(2.64) (2.12)
Treated × 1818 0.0806∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗
(2.90) (7.75)
Treated × 1819 0.0855∗∗∗ 0.263
(3.67) (1.66)
Treated × 1820 0.0837∗∗∗ 0.211
(7.15) (1.68)
Treated × 1821 0.0849∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗
(17.32) (2.89)
Treated × 1822 0.0779∗∗∗ 0.305
(10.16) (1.35)
Treated × 1823 0.112∗∗∗ 0.170
(4.85) (1.88)
Treated × 1824 0.0886∗∗∗ 0.0892
Year FE X X
City FE X
Family FE X
Observations 97316 4224
Notes: Reference year: 1814. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Treated cities: Aachen and Hagen.
Control cities: Frankfurt (Main), Hannover, Hei-
delberg, and Mannheim. Results based on equation
2. We only include parents without national first
given name. Clustered standard errors at the city
level.
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Table B.4: Diff-in-Diff, Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Dummy National First Name
DiD Coefficient...
...overall 1.666∗∗ 1.875∗∗∗
(2.37) (4.71)
...Aachen 2.099∗∗∗ 2.369∗∗∗
(4.46) (4.54)
...Hagen 1.457∗∗∗ 1.558∗∗∗
(2.68) (2.67)
After 1815 1.379∗∗∗ 1.376∗∗∗ 1.207∗∗∗ 1.207∗∗∗
(4.00) (4.05) (2.74) (2.74)
City FE X X
Family FE X X
Observations 77328 77328 2422 2422
Notes: Coefficients display odds ratios; z statistics in parentheses. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Treated cities: Aachen and Hagen. Control cities:
Frankfurt (Main), Hannover, Heidelberg, and Mannheim. Results based
on equation 3. We only include parents without national first given name.
Clustered standard errors at the city level.
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Table B.5: Treatment Analysis 1815, Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel 1: National conditional on family tradition
DiD Coefficient...
...overall 0.0787∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗
(4.89) (5.32)
...Aachen 0.0595∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗
(20.35) (15.99)
...Hagen 0.100∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗
(34.39) (10.27)
After 1815 0.0329∗∗∗ 0.0329∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(11.25) (11.25) (4.74) (4.74)
City FE X X
Family FE X X
Observations 77328 77328 2308 2308
Panel 2: Excluding Wilhelm
DiD Coefficient...
...overall 0.0723∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗
(5.46) (3.02)
...Aachen 0.0568∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
(17.10) (16.35)
...Hagen 0.0901∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(27.11) (7.02)
After 1815 0.0248∗∗∗ 0.0248∗∗∗ 0.0484∗ 0.0484∗
(7.46) (7.46) (2.12) (2.12)
City FE X X
Family FE X X
Observations 76720 76720 2330 2330
Panel 3: Berlin as control group
DiD Coefficient...
...overall 0.111∗∗∗ 0.322∗
(6.65) (4.24)
...Aachen 0.0925∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗
(3.90e+10) (1.55e+15)
...Hagen 0.131∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(7.77e+11) (1.15e+15)
After 1815 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0657 0.0657∗∗∗
(2.86e+10) (7.44e+10) (5.43e+10) (2.80e+14)
City FE X X
Family FE X X
Observations 64631 64631 2332 2332
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Panel 1 and 2: Treated cities: Aachen and
Hagen. Control cities: Frankfurt (Main), Hannover, Heidelberg, and Mannheim. Panel
3: Treated cities: Aachen and Hagen. Control city: Berlin. In panel 1, we use national
first names conditional on family tradition as dependent variable, i.e. we exclude families
that choose a middle name from the parents as first name of the child. In panel 2, we
exclude all families that choose “Wilhelm” as first name. Results based on equation 3.
We only include parents without national first given name. Clustered standard errors at
the city level.
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Table B.6: Treatment Analysis 1815, Adjustment Aachen
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Dummy National First Name
DiD Coefficient...
...overall 0.0368 0.105
(0.72) (1.11)
...Aachen -0.0256∗∗∗ -0.0105
(-9.49) (-0.44)
...Hagen 0.107∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗
(39.84) (9.48)
After 1815 0.0339∗∗∗ 0.0339∗∗∗ 0.0843∗∗ 0.0843∗∗
(12.56) (12.56) (3.54) (3.54)
City FE X X
Family FE X X
Observations 77328 77328 2454 2454
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Treated cities: Aachen and Hagen.
Control cities: Frankfurt (Main), Hannover, Heidelberg, and Mannheim. Here,
we assume that all French first names were “francicised” and thus, use the
German translations. Results based on equation 3. We only include parents
without national first given name. Clustered standard errors at the city level.
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Table B.7: Treatment Analysis 1866
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Dummy National First Name
DiD Coefficient...
...overall 0.0000723 -0.0181
(0.01) (-0.49)
...Frankfurt 0.00622 0.0564∗∗∗
(1.12) (5.07)
...Hannover -0.0238∗∗∗ -0.0694∗∗∗
(-4.27) (-6.24)
After 1866 0.0193∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗ 0.0705∗∗∗ 0.0639∗∗∗
(3.87) (3.95) (5.14) (5.75)
City FE X X
Family FE X X
Observations 66016 66016 6408 6408
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Treated cities: Frankfurt (Main) and
Hannover. Control cities: Heidelberg, Luebeck, Mannheim, and Nuernberg. We
only include parents without national first given name. Clustered standard errors
at the city level.
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Figure B.1: Event Study, 1805-1824, City FE
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Note: The plot captures the coefficients from equation 2 based on column 1, Appendix Table B.3. Reference
year: 1814.
Figure B.2: Event Study, 1805-1824, Family FE
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Note: The plot captures the coefficients from equation 2 based on column 2, Appendix Table B.3. Reference
year: 1814.
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Figure B.3: Development National First Names, 1805-1824
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Note: Treated cities: Aachen and Hagen. Control cities: Frankfurt (Main), Hannover, Heidelberg, and
Mannheim.
Figure B.4: Development National First Names, 1810-1874
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Note: Balanced panel for 1810-1874. Includes: Frankfurt (Main), Hannover, Nuernberg, Hagen, Berlin,
Aachen, Mannheim and Heidelberg.
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Figure B.5: Development First Names, 1810-1874
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Note: Balanced panel for 1810-1874. Includes: Frankfurt (Main), Hannover, Nuernberg, Hagen, Berlin,
Aachen, Mannheim and Heidelberg.
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